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STATEMENT OP FACTS
The Appellant stands on the Statement of Facts submitted in
his initial Memorandum filed with this Court. Although Respondent
has failed to cite to the record to support the allegations set
forth in his Statement of Facts, Appellant would generally accept
those facts with the exception of Paragraph No. 7.

In Paragraph

No. 7, only the first sentence, alleging that Mr. Thomas moved to
the State of Wyoming in 1984, has any basis in the record.

The

rest of the "facts" set forth are unfounded and unsupported
conclusions and allegations and should be disregarded.

ARGUMENT
I. THIS MATTER INVOLVES A CIVIL APPEAL AND CIVIL SANCTIONS.
A*

This Proceeding is a Civil Proceeding.

In Respondent's Brief, Respondent begins with the erroneous
assumption that the proceedings before this Court are in some
nature criminal proceedings.
While the sole existing contempt order entered by the trial
court, which survives, is a criminal contempt order, the issues
before this Court are purely civil in nature.

This case is an

appeal from an order of summary judgment entered by the trial court
in a case brought to renew a civil judgment.
There is no provision in the criminal law for a motion for
summary judgment.

Nor is there any provision in the criminal law

for an action for a renewal of judgment that would end this case.
This Court has already held the current proceedings are nothing but
an extension of prior civil proceedings. Accordingly, it would be
inappropriate to limit the discussion of this matter to issues
relating solely to criminal contempt.
B.

Dismissal Is Inappropriate Even In A Criminal Context.

Respondent argues that this Court's decision in D1Aston v.
D1Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1990) is inapplicable because we
are in a criminal and not a civil context. As demonstrated above,
this is not correct.

However, even if we were operating in a

criminal context as opposed to a civil context, the D1Aston
decision would still apply, and dismissal would still be inappropriate.
In D'Aston, this Court recognized that no Utah Appellate Court
had previously rendered a decision on the availability of the
sanction of staying or dismissing an appeal for failure of an
appellant Lu comply with a trial court's order in the same or a
related proceeding.
Accordingly, this Court examined the law of other jurisdictions and the law in the State of Utah relating to dismissal of
appeals in criminal settings.

The very underpinnings of the

DfAston decision therefore, are based in an examination of existing
criminal l<aw, the law of other jurisdictions and perhaps most
2

importantly, an analysis of the requirements under the Utah State
Constitution.
An examination of this case under the cited Utah State
criminal authority and Statutory and Constitutional provisions
clearly demonstrates that dismissal would be inappropriate in this
case.

In Respondent's Brief, he cites to the case of Hardy v.

Morris. 636 P.2d 473 (Utah, 1981), for the proposition that the
criminal

appeal

of

an

escaped

prisoner

can

be

dismissed.

Respondent's ignore the fact that Hardy was explained in the case
of State v. Tuttle. 713 P. 2d 703 Utah 1985) wherein the Utah
Supreme Court held that an appellant prisoner's escape "is not an
abandonment of his right to an appeal and that the dismissal of his
appeal is not an appropriate punishment for his escape".

D'Aston

at 593.
Respondent goes on to argue that because an escaped criminal's
criminal appeal can be dismissed until he is recaptured, Mr.
Thomas' appeal should -be dismissed because he is outside of the
jurisdiction of the authorities of Kane County.
The inapplicability of the Hardy and Tuttle cases to the
present case is rather obvious.

Both Hardy and Tuttle dealt with

scenarios in which a prisoner had escaped and fled custody.

The

fact that the inmates were at large, indicates that they were free
to return to custody at whatsoever time they chose.
3

This is in

contrast with Mr. Thomas' situation where he is currently in
custody, he is simply in custody some place else.

He clearly has

no present ability to conform to any court's order.

As is

discussed below, this matter of impossibility is the key to the
entire issue currently, before this Court.
II.

DISMISSAL OF THIS APPEAL IS AN INAPPROPRIATE SANCTION

A.
The Actions of This Court Constitute a Separate Contempt
Proceeding.
Throughout Respondent's Brief, there runs an erroneous thread
of thought that this Court is seeking to enforce the original order
which Mr. Thomas failed to comply with.

That is not the case.

This Court is instead seeking to punish Mr. Thomas for his failure
to serve a thirty (3 0) day jail sentence which was imposed on Mr.
Thomas and upheld by the Supreme Court.

Mr. Thomas' failure to

appear resulted in a contempt order being entered against him.
This

Court

now

seeks

additional

sanctions.

These

new

sanctions, constituting the stay or dismissal of Mr. Thomas'
appeal, are not based upon his failure to appear before the court
as previously ordered, but are rather based on Mr. Thomas' failure
t6 serve the jail ^enLeiice." *As~^udh, this constitutes^an entirely
separate contempt proceeding.
Because this is a new contempt proceeding, the question of
impossibility is to be measured now, at the time the sanction is
sought to be imposed.

Bradshaw v. Kershaw. 627 P.2d 528 (Utah
4

1981).

Furthermore, Mr. Thomas should be afforded the due process

protections which must be satisfied in a contempt proceeding. This
would include a finding of a present ability to perform.

Since

such a finding cannot be made, the Appeal should proceed.
It would be inappropriate to dismiss Mr. Thomas' appeal.
B.
Defense.

Respondent Fails To Correctly Address The Impossibility

The Respondent seeks to deny the availability of the impossibility defense to Mr. Thomas based on the fact Mr. Thomas had
previous opportunities to comply with the Court's Order that he
serve thirty (30) days in the Kane County jail.

The problem with

this analysis is that the issue is not what Mr. Thomas could or
could not have done previously, but rather what is Mr. Thomas'
ability to perform at the time the sanction is sought to be
imposed.
In Bradshaw. the Utah Supreme Court held:
When the proposed sanction is coercive imprisonment,
the defense of impossibility ^of .performance as of the
time the sanction is to be imposed would always" be
available without regard to how or by whom the condition
of impossibility occurred. It is obviously repugnant to
reason and futile to try to coerce an act that the
contemnoi has no present ability to perform. . . consequently, the defense of impossibility is uniformly held
available to this type of sanction.
In fact, the
sanction cannot be imposed without an affirmative finding
of present ability to comply.
Bradshaw at 531.

5

The Supreme Court's language is clear. Where the issue is one
of coercive imprisonment, the time for evaluating the defense of
impossibility of performance is the time that the sanction is to be
imposed.

This Court is seeking to impose a sanction now of

dismissal of Mr. Thomas' appeal, while it is undisputed that Mr.
Thomas has no present ability to perform.

Furthermore, as the

Supreme Court clearly stated, the defense is available irrespective
as to how or by whom the condition of impossibility occurred.
Under the plain language of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bradshaw,

the

dismissal

of Mr. Thomas' appeal

is therefore

inappropriate.
C
A Dismissal Without Prejudice of Mr. Thomas' Appeal Would
Be Inequitable.
The underlying case in this appeal is one for a renewal of a
judgment.

It is Mr. Thomas' position that the judgment sought to

be renewed is now void. Staying this matter, or dismissing it with
a right of later reinstatement would allow the respondents to
continue collections action against Mr. Thomas during the intervening period of time.

Mr. Thomas does not have the financial

capability of filing a supersedeas~bdna irf^this matter. Therefore,
any assets which Mr. Thomas might come into control of will be
subject to the depredations of the Respondents even though it is
Mr. Thomas' view that after the issues of this appeal are consid-
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ered on all of their merits, Respondents will have no rights to
take further collections action*
On one point, both parties are in agreement, a stay of this
matter would be inappropriate.

The difference is that Appellant

would request this Court address the issues on their merits, while
the Respondents would simply have things continue in a status quo,
allowing them to continue their collection efforts.
Unlike the scenario in DfAston, where compliance with the
court's order was necessary to protect the ability of the Respondent to collect on its judgment if such judgment were upheld, Mr.
Thomas' serving of thirty (30) days in the Kane County Jail, while
perhaps giving some emotional satisfaction to the Respondents,
would in no manner improve their possibilities of recovering their
judgment or protect their interests in any way.
Delay of this matter simply delays justice. In this case the
adage is true that justice delayed is justice denied.

CONCLUSION
The issue in this case is an issue of civil law and not
criminal. Whether the Court accepts the view of the Appellant that
the Court's actions comprise a new action for contempt or the view
of the Respondent that this is simply an attempt on the part of the
Court*to enforce the prior order of the trial court sentencing Mr.
7

Thomas to thirty (3 0) days in jail, the defense of impossibility is
available and precludes a dismissal of this appeal.
In addition to the considerations and arguments raised above,
Mr. Thomas' would draw the court's attention to the constitutional
arguments raised in his initial memoranda.

Those arguments have

not been responded to in any manner within the Respondent's Brief,
and accordingly will not be dealt with further here.
WHEREFORE, Mr. Thomas respectfully requests this Court vacate
the prior Order of Dismissal and consider this case on its merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this J_

day of April, 1994.
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